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THE MILIEU OF THE BOARDROOM AND THE
PRECINCT OF EMPLOYMENT*
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT**

INTRODUCTION
Although directors who serve on a large corporation’s board share an
association with the corporation’s employees, the law defines their
roles, duties, and rights very differently. So differently, in fact, that,
metaphorically, directors and employees occupy different spaces
within the corporation. Employees occupy a hierarchically-structured
precinct oriented around the corporation’s right to exercise control
over them. In the law’s view, the right extends from the depths to the
heights of a managerial hierarchy because all employees at all ranks
have a duty to comply with lawful instructions, however lofty their
position within the corporation.1 The right of control is not eliminated
if a particular corporation structures its employees’ work into teams
or otherwise confers discretion on them to determine how best to do
their work.2 Moreover, and less legalistically, the precinct—a space
with enclosures—occupied by employees is designed in many ways to
reinforce employees’ identification with the corporation and its
objectives in performing their work.
In contrast to the hierarchically-structured precinct of
employment, the law assigns ultimate managerial responsibility to a
corporation’s board of directors.3 The milieu of a board’s members
* © 2011 Deborah A. DeMott.
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1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c (2006); see also id. § 7.07
cmt. f (noting that an employer retains a right of control over employees despite
infrequent exercise of the right and that right extends to senior executive officers); Reilly
v. Polychrome Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1265, 1268–69 (S.D.N.Y) (holding that a corporation’s
vice president committed a material breach of duty by disregarding the president’s order
that he report to work although the vice president claimed that he believed his presence at
work was unimportant to the corporation at the time), aff’d, 71 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1995).
2. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.01 cmt. c (noting that a principal’s failure to
exercise its right of control does not eliminate the right).
3. For the most influential statutory formulations on this point, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors,” unless the statute or corporation’s certificate of incorporation provides
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differs in many ways from the precinct of employment. The law
requires that board members, in discharging their responsibilities,
bring independent judgment to bear in the best interests of the
corporation.4 This requirement presupposes intellectual and
emotional distance from the corporation’s management and their
project. Structurally, directors act as members of a board and as
members of board committees.5 Directors exercise original
undelegated power that is not subject to the control of others, most
particularly the corporation’s shareholders.6
Thus, the simple fact that shareholders are unlikely to vote in
favor of a transaction that requires shareholder approval does not
establish that the board breached its duties to the corporation by
entering into the transaction. As one court recently stated the basic
point, “[d]irectors are not thermometers, existing to register the everchanging sentiments of stockholders. Directors are expected to use
their own business judgment to advance the interests of the
corporation and its stockholders.”7
Moreover, a board is comprised of members, most not otherwise
associated with the corporation, whose duties to the corporation
typically coexist with other financially-significant associations and
allegiances, including full-time employment in the past or present by
another corporation or large institution, such as a major university.
To be sure, all directors owe duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation in question,8 but the operation of those duties is specific
otherwise); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (stating that “[a]ll corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation,
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction,
and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors” subject to any limitation set forth in
corporation’s articles or in legally-effective shareholder agreements).
4. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 10:11, at 182–86 (3d ed. 2010).
5. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (recognizing that directors, although
individually subject to duties, discharge them as members of a collegial body, either the
entire board or a committee of the board).
6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.01 cmt. f(2).
7. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that
directors did not breach their duty of loyalty in approving proposed merger agreement
containing $25 million termination fee on the basis that the board knew shareholders were
unlikely to approve the agreement and imposing liability on directors would require
“speculative second-guessing” inconsistent with the business judgment rule).
8. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) cmt. 1 (stating that a statutory mandate
requiring a director to act “in good faith” and “in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation” is a mandate that “governs all
aspects of directors’ duties: the duty of care, the duty to become informed, the duty of
inquiry, the duty of informed judgment, the duty of attention, the duty of disclosure, the
duty of loyalty, the duty of fair dealing, and finally, the broad concept of fiduciary duty
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to an association of a particular scope.9 For many directors, the scope
of the connection—among all the connections that a successful adult
may have—is far from all-encompassing. Multiple associations may
create the risk of conflict with the corporation’s interests or of
indifference to its fortunes. Somewhat paradoxically, multiple
associations may also create reputational constraints on how directors
act in the face of conflicts and risks to the corporation, given
directors’ wider web of business and professional relationships in
which reputation matters. Observed a Delaware court:
[C]orporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply
enmeshed in social institutions . . . [which] have norms,
expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and
channel the behavior of those who participate in their
operation. Some things are “just not done,” or only at a cost,
which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but may
involve a loss of standing in the institution.10
Thus, directors’ wider associations carry risks for the corporation
because they may trump fidelity to the corporation’s best interests
among a director’s array of loyalties. However, conduct in the milieu
of the boardroom is also subject to extramural constraints and
influences that may prove beneficial for the corporation. That is,
widely-connected directors have an interest in developing and
preserving a reputation for probity and effectiveness that transcends
their service in any particular boardroom.11 Moreover, directors’
extramural connections may bear no material relationship to a

that the courts often use as a broad frame of reference when evaluating a director’s
conduct”).
9. Thus, a nonofficer director is free, absent an agreement stipulating otherwise, to
engage in business activities that do not compete with the corporation and to pursue
business opportunities that are unrelated to the corporation and its business. See 2 COX &
HAZEN, supra note 4, § 11:8, at 274 (“What opportunities are so related to the
corporation’s business . . . is answered only in the context of the circumstances of the
particular case and sometimes depends on the particular test followed by the
jurisdiction.”).
10. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citation
omitted), aff’d, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005).
11. Along these lines, Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach observe that “a director who
develops a public reputation as a poor monitor is hurt with respect to the number of board
seats he or she holds.” Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE
58, 95 (2010). On the other hand, “a director who develops a private reputation as a poor
monitor—that is, as someone unlikely to rock the boat—might be favored by CEOs who
are looking to acquire power at the expense of the board.” Id.
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corporation’s activities or may be aligned with it as a source of
profitable business opportunities.
This brief Commentary sketches functional differences between
employment and service on a board with the objective of considering
whether and how the research findings on diversity management
surveyed by Brooke and Tyler in this issue12 might be translated from
the employment context to the boardroom. On the one hand, the law
and corporate practice do not posit that an outside director’s
membership on a board requires comprehensive identification with
the corporation and its interests, but much of Brooke and Tyler’s
argument assumes that employers should structure dealings with
employees to reinforce their identification with the corporation and
its objectives in performing their work.13 On the other hand, although
effective outside directors bring a capacity for emotional and
intellectual distance to their duties, they possess and exercise ultimate
power over the corporation’s management. Thus empowered and
positioned, outside directors have the capacity to focus senior
management’s attention on diversity issues, in particular those within
the precinct of employment.
I. LEGAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES
A. Directors and Employees
In assessing whether scholarship focused on the consequences of
diversity in corporate workforces has salience if extrapolated to the
board, it is helpful to consider how boards are structured and how
they operate. In fundamental respects, a director’s position is at
opposite poles from that of an employee. In contrast to employees,
directors have a relatively strong tenure within the corporation
because, once elected (for terms of at least one and potentially four
years),14 directors can be removed only by action supported by a
majority of the voting shares.15 In Delaware corporations, if directors’
12. Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011).
13. See id. at 724 (“Fairly treated employees will identify more with their
organization . . . .”).
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2008) (directors may be elected for
staggered terms of up to three years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-06 (2009) (directors may be
elected for staggered terms of up to four years); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (directors
may be elected for staggered terms of up to three years).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (stating that “the holders of a majority of the
shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors” may remove any director or the
entire board); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08(d) (stating that a director may only be
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terms are staggered, they are removable only for cause and not
because holders of a majority of the voting shares would prefer new
directors.16
In contrast, in the absence of a contract providing otherwise,
employees in the United States have an at-will relationship that the
employer may terminate at any time.17 Directors’ relative security of
tenure should buttress their ability to bring independent judgment to
bear, awkward though that might be in the face of disagreement with
senior management. It is also the board’s responsibility to hire the
chief executive officer (“CEO”) and other chief officers and, most
directly for the CEO, to determine when the relationship should
come to an end, even when the board has operated in a CEO-centric
fashion up to that point.18 Thus, although CEOs tend to be heavily
involved in selecting and recruiting directors and many historically
thought of the board as “their” board, formal legal structure allocates
ultimate power to the board in relationships with the CEO and other
senior officers.19 This allocation of power differentiates the milieu of
the boardroom from the precinct of employment in both obvious and
subtle ways. To be sure, there is no “cult” of the independent director
comparable to the “cult” of the celebrity CEO.20 But, both board and
CEO are aware of the ultimate allocation of managerial power.
B.

Board Structure and Committees

How a board is structured and how it performs its work also bear
on the contrast with employees. Much work is done by contemporary

removed by shareholders at meeting called for that purpose); id. § 7.25(a)–(c) (stating that
unless the articles of incorporation require a greater number of affirmative votes, action
on a matter requires that votes cast in favor exceed votes cast in opposition).
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (stating that unless the certificate of
incorporation provides otherwise, members of a staggered board are removable only upon
a showing of cause); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (stipulating that directors are
removable by shareholders with or without cause unless articles of incorporation provide
for removal only for cause).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.01 cmt. a (2006)
(explaining the presumption that employment is at-will is recognized in forty-nine states,
except Montana, which has enacted a wrongful-dismissal statute).
18. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:1, at 2.
19. Id.
20. See Adams et al., supra note 11, at 102 (commenting that “[i]t is interesting to
speculate about the extent to which the ‘cult of the CEO’ that has emerged in the last
twenty years helps explain the rise in CEO turnovers” and belief that CEO is crucial to a
firm’s success or failure may lead directors “to over attribute bad outcomes to the CEO
and under attribute them to circumstances”).
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boards within committees.21 Federal law requires that the crucial
audit committee be comprised entirely of outside directors.22
Likewise, stock exchange listing requirements mandate that only
independent directors serve on compensation committees.23 A
consequence of this fact is a shift in the texture of meetings of the full
board, with more time and attention focused on engagement with the
work of committees, arguably diminishing the force with which the
entire board might be characterized as a team.24 Additionally, boards
discharge more than one function—somewhat in tension with one
another—and which function is the most significant evolves over time
and with circumstances, sometimes in response to legal mandates. For
example, contemporary boards are subject to a general duty to
monitor the company’s compliance with legal and regulatory
mandates, while an earlier era limited the board’s function to
reviewing and approving corporate strategy.25 Although outside
directors may serve as sources of advice to the corporation’s senior
management, the effectiveness of a contemporary board increasingly
turns on the success with which it monitors, in particular (and most
directly through the board’s audit committee), the quality of the
corporation’s financial accounting, control, and risk-management
systems.
C.

Duties to Monitor

A contemporary board’s monitoring function necessarily
presupposes a measure of distance from senior management, and
arguably, from the immediate preferences of at least some of the
corporation’s shareholders.26 This function may operate somewhat in
tension with the board’s advisory role. The board’s monitoring
function also suggests another metric of firm performance, which is
21. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:18, at 101 (“Indeed, the boards of the large,
publicly held corporations could not function effectively without committees.”).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that the SEC by rule shall direct
stock exchanges and national securities associations to revise rules to prohibit the listing of
any security by any issuer unless each member of the issuer’s audit committee is a member
of the issuer’s board and is otherwise independent).
23. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303.A.05(a) (2009) (“Listed companies must have a compensation committee
composed entirely of independent directors.”).
24. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:18, at 101 (“In most large corporations,
many important board of director decisions are made by committees . . . not by the full
boards themselves.”).
25. See id. § 9:2, at 6.
26. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1335 (2002).
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whether the company has restated its financial reports or disclosed
deficiencies in its internal controls, the latter disclosure required of
large public companies since 2004.27 This metric does not appear to be
one considered in the academic literature that examines indicia of
board diversity in relationship to measures of corporate performance.
The metric comes to mind because female directors in a 1996 to 2003
study were more likely than males to serve on audit, corporate
governance, and nominating committees,28 but, interestingly, not
compensation committees.29
That female directors are more likely to serve on board
committees—in particular the audit committee—to which explicit
monitoring functions are assigned, bears directly on the relevance to
the milieu of the boardroom of the employment-based research
findings explored by Brooke and Tyler. In particular, women and
other directors who are dissimilar from their colleagues on the entire
board may be especially well-suited to discharge monitoring
responsibilities. Brooke and Tyler report that when an organization
appropriately manages diversity in a workforce, diversity may enable
the organization “to have franker discussions and make better
decisions”30 by reducing “groupthink, . . . the tendency of group
members to value unanimity at the expense of rational debate.”31
Groupthink is antithetical to effective monitoring. Indeed, effective
monitoring may require a perspective broader than that of the
interests of a particular corporation and its shareholders; the integrity
with which a corporation prepares and reports its financial results has
systemic implications. The structural insulation of the audit
committee from senior management and directors affiliated with
management may buttress its monitoring capacity through exclusion.
Its separateness from the remainder of the board emphasizes the
necessity of compliance with externally-set norms that should orient
the committee’s members and the company’s external and internal
auditors. Moreover, in Brooke and Tyler’s assessment, “there is no
27. Between January 1, 2004 and May 2, 2005, eleven percent of large public
companies disclosed deficiencies in internal controls on the basis of evaluations by their
external auditors. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164–65 (2006).
28. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 298–300 (2009). The likelihood of
service on an audit committee by a female director was 7.5% higher than for a male
director. Id. at 300.
29. See id.
30. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 731.
31. Id. at 730–31.
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evidence suggesting that the interpersonal dynamics of diversity
change depending upon the level of management involved.”32
D. The Board and Personnel Practices Deeper Within the
Organization
Separately, potential relationships between a board’s
composition and employees’ identification with the corporation
deserve further empirical scrutiny. The board may, for example,
strongly encourage—if not order—the implementation of personnel
practices that develop and reinforce employees’ identification with
the corporation. The board’s composition may bear on the likelihood
that it will do so. Broome, Conley, and Krawiec’s respondents suggest
that this may be so, with one reporting that without a director’s
“insistence,” management would not have reported on gender and
racial diversity within the company.33 Another respondent reports
“hold[ing] the CEO’s feet to the fire on these things” and making
employment metrics a factor in determining the CEO’s
compensation.34 The goal was not one “that the CEO came to you
with, it’s one the board went to him with.”35 Of course, these
responses also illustrate that within the milieu of the boardroom, the
CEO’s power is subject to constraints not present in the precinct of
employment. Directors, that is, are not consultants whose advice a
CEO may safely ignore, but members of a board to whom the CEO is
accountable and who may redefine the CEO’s agenda.36 Further
empirical investigation might usefully investigate relationships
between board composition and board-led redefinitions of senior
management’s agenda.
More indirectly, might the board’s composition itself shape how
employees view the corporation? In exploring how employees
perceive a corporation’s interest in their input, Tyler and Brooke
differentiate between superficial gestures and credible practices
32. Id. at 746.
33. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories:
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 798 (2011) (reporting that
the board began receiving “ ‘data on both gender and racial diversity at levels in the
company’ ” at the “ ‘insistence’ ” of the board’s sole African American member) (quoting
interview respondent).
34. Id. at 798–99.
35. Id. at 799.
36. Thus, as advisers to the CEO, directors’ value may stem from the structural fact
that “the CEO cannot ignore them,” although external consultants may have greater
subject-matter expertise. Adams et al., supra note 11, at 100. Alternatively, a CEO may be
“especially careful when it comes to those dimensions on which a director’s expertise
could cause her to block what the CEO wishes to do.” Id.
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reflecting that an employer took its employees’ concerns seriously.37
Viewed in this light, is the diverse composition of a corporation’s
board analogous to a suggestion box into which employees may make
deposits that are never read? To a one-day diversity training
program? Organizationally, the board is situated several steps from
the day-to-day experiences of most employees, which vitiates the
significance of the board’s composition. In contrast, diverse
composition of a corporation’s supervisory workforce bears more
directly and immediately on most employees.
Although senior management’s position is more remote from
rank-and-file employees, its composition may be salient throughout a
corporation’s ranks of employees because senior management
constitutes the site of effective power over operations. On the other
hand, perhaps the composition of the board has a broader symbolic
import, in light of its ultimate managerial responsibility. On this
score, the responses elicited by Broome, Conley, and Krawiec are
intriguing, with one respondent “emphasiz[ing] that the presence of
female board members had been important to her when she was an
employee,”38 and another female director reporting that senior female
managers told her “how much it meant to them to have a woman
sitting there.”39
CONCLUSION
The milieu of the boardroom and the precinct of employment
interact in ways that deserve further scrutiny, as Brooke and Tyler
conclude.40 Bearing in mind the nature of the duties discharged by the
board, definitive evidence of these interactions may prove elusive,
just as the impact of the board itself is hard to demonstrate in the
absence of major lapses in the effectiveness with which the board has
monitored management.41 Nonetheless, a diverse board may be more
effective in monitoring management because “groupthink”
phenomena may be less prevalent. Separately, diverse members on a
board may be especially willing to refocus the attention of senior
management on diversity issues within the corporation’s workforce.

37. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 730.
38. Broome et al., supra note 33, at 793.
39. Id.
40. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 740.
41. Adams et al., supra note 11, at 58 (noting that although the board’s “day-to-day
impact is difficult to observe . . . when things go wrong they can become the center of
attention”).
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